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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
WILLIAM RICHARD SHELTON, IV,
Defendant-Appellant.

NOS. 48471-2020, 48472-2020,
& 48477-2020
Canyon County Case Nos.
CR14-18-3994, CR14-18-3999,
& CR14-18-16653

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Has Shelton failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced
him to an aggregate unified sentence of eight years with three years fixed after he pleaded guilty
to three counts of grand theft?
ARGUMENT
Shelton Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
On October 4, 2017, Allison Moore’s vehicle was broken into outside the Sunnyridge

Retirement Community. (PSI, p.3.) A window was broken and Moore’s billfold was stolen. (PSI,
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p.3.) Shelton was captured on surveillance attempting to use Moore’s financial transaction card at
Walgreens. (PSI, pp.3-4.)
On October 13, 2017, Earlene Taylor’s vehicle was broken into outside the Caldwell Senior
Center. (PSI, p.4.) A window was broken and Taylor’s purse and iPhone were stolen. (PSI, p.4.)
Shelton was captured on surveillance using Taylor’s financial transaction card at Walgreens. (PSI,
pp.4-5.) Several days later, two other individuals—Pattina Leeper and Timothy Aldous—were
found in possession of Taylor’s driver’s license, social security card, and checkbook. (PSI, p.4.)
Leeper told law enforcement she got Taylor’s property from Shelton. (PSI, p.4.) Leeper stated
that “Shelton would break into the vehicles, bring her what he got,” and she would “try to get rid
of these items by finding buyers online,” and another individual would “work on the checks.”
(PSI, p.4.)
On November 9, 2017, Lisa Woolum’s vehicle was broken into outside Wilson Elementary
School. (R. Vol. I, p.11.) A window was broken and Woolum’s purse was stolen. (R. Vol. I,
p.11.) Shelton was captured on surveillance using Woolum’s financial transaction card at Walmart
and Maverick. (R. Vol. I, p.11.)
Shelton admitted to law enforcement that “he is with a group and his job is to use stolen
credit cards to purchase prepaid gift cards in exchange for cash and drugs.” (PSI, p.4.) He stated
that he worked with Leeper and Aldous, driving around and breaking into vehicles. (PSI, p.5.) He
was found in possession of numerous other items that had been reported stolen from other
individuals’ vehicles, including a laptop, a unique acrylic stapler and tape dispenser, and a set of
keys. (PSI, p.5.)
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On August 17, 2018, law enforcement responded to a report that a man on a bike was trying
to break into vehicles outside Heart & Home. (R. Vol. III, p.8. 1) Laurie Correll reported that she
saw a man break the window of her vehicle and steal her purse from inside. (R. Vol. III, pp.8-9.)
Officer’s located the suspect’s bike and backpack. (R. Vol. III, p.8.) Inside the backpack, officers
found papers belonging to Shelton. (R. Vol. III, p.8.) Witnesses identified the suspect as Shelton.
(R. Vol. III, p.9.)
In case number CR14-18-3994, the state charged Shelton with two counts of grand theft
by possession of stolen property related to the Taylor and Woolum thefts. (R. Vol. I, pp.38-40.)
In case number CR14-18-3999, the state charged Shelton with grand theft by possession of stolen
property related to the Moore theft. (R. Vol. II, p.34-35.) In case number CR14-18-16653, the
state charged Shelton with four counts of grand theft, one count of burglary, one count of malicious
injury to property, and one count of petit theft related to the Correll theft. (R. Vol. III, pp.23-26.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shelton pleaded guilty to one count of grand theft in each
case and the state dismissed the remaining counts (as well as several other pending cases against
Shelton). (R. Vol. III, pp.32-45, 49; R. Vol. I, p.47; PSI, pp.9-10; 6/13/18 Tr., p.3, L.12 – p.4,
L.21; p.8, L.21 – p.10, L.13; 9/19/18 Tr., p.16, L.3 – p.19, L.10.) The district court sentenced
Shelton to eight years with three years fixed in case number CR14-18-3994, five years with two
years fixed in case number CR14-18-3999, and eight years with three years fixed in case number
CR14-18-16653, with all sentences to run concurrently. 2 (R. Vol. I, pp.51-52; R. Vol. II, pp.48-
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The Clerk’s Record appears in three volumes. Volume I relates to Docket No. 48471, case
number CR14-18-3994; Volume II relates to Docket No. 48477, case number CR14-18-3999; and
Volume III relates to Docket No. 48472, case number CR14-18-16653.
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Shelton filed a pro se Rule 35 motion to reduce his sentences in each case. (R. Vol. III, pp.6163.) The district court granted the motion insofar as it corrected the amount of credit for time
served Shelton received; otherwise, the district court denied Shelton’s request for leniency. (R.
Vol. III, pp.76, 93-96.) Later, Shelton filed a second Rule 35 motion, which the district court also
3

49; R. Vol. III, pp.51-52.) Pursuant to a grant of post-conviction relief, the district court restored
Shelton’s appeal rights by re-entering the judgments of conviction in each case. (R. Vol. I, pp.11013; R. Vol. II, pp.60-63; R. Vol. III, pp.98-101.) Thereafter, Shelton filed timely notices of appeal.
(R. Vol. I, pp.115-17, 125-28; R. Vol. II, pp.65-67, 75-78; R. Vol. III, pp.106-08, 138-41.) This
Court consolidated all three cases on appeal. (R. Vol. III, p.143.)
B.

Standard Of Review
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,
159 P.3d 838 (2007)). Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d
614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). In evaluating
whether a lower court abused its discretion, the appellate court conducts a four-part inquiry, which
asks “whether the court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.” State v.
Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 272, 429 P.3d 149, 160 (2018) (citing Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163
Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018)).

denied. (R. Vol. III, pp.110-14, 128-29; Aug., pp.1-12.) Shelton does not challenge the denial of
either Rule 35 motion on appeal.
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C.

Shelton Has Shown No Abuse Of The District Court’s Discretion
As an initial matter, this Court should dismiss this appeal because Shelton waived his right

to appeal his sentences. This Court will enforce a defendant’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his right to appeal. See McKinney v. State, 162 Idaho 286, 296-97, 396 P.3d 1168,
1178-79 (2017). In his Guilty Plea Advisory form, Shelton specifically indicated that he was
waiving his right to appeal his sentences as part of the plea agreement. (R. Vol. III, p.38.) Because
that is the only issue he has raised in his opening brief, this Court should dismiss his appeal.
If this Court reaches the merits of Shelton’s appeal, he has failed to show any abuse of the
district court’s sentencing discretion. To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion,
the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether
the appellant met this burden, the court considers the entire sentence but presumes that the
determinate portion will be the period of actual incarceration. State v. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895,
392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017) (citing Oliver, 144 Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391). “When reviewing
the reasonableness of a sentence, this Court conducts an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the
public interest.” State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015). To establish that
the sentence was excessive, the appellant must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of protecting society,
deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.’” State v. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 608, 434 P.3d 209, 212 (2018)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
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The sentences imposed are reasonable in light of Shelton’s extensive pattern of criminal
behavior. His criminal history consists of two decades of substance abuse and property theft
crimes. (PSI, pp.6-10.) He had ten felony convictions prior to his convictions in these cases,
which bring his total felony conviction count up to thirteen, and he had thirteen pending felonies
in five other cases that were dismissed as part of the plea agreement. (PSI, pp.6-9, 19.)
Shelton’s conduct underlying these cases (as well as the dismissed cases) further
demonstrates this pattern of criminal behavior. Shelton was involved in numerous vehicle
burglaries, where the vehicle’s windows were broken and items inside were stolen; Shelton would
then use financial transaction cards found inside. (See PSI, pp.3-6, 40-58; R. Vol. III, pp.8-9.)
Not only was Shelton under the influence of controlled substances while he committed many of
the offenses, he reported that he committed the crimes to get money to continue supporting his
drug habit. (PSI, pp.4, 6.) Even after being contacted by law enforcement, Shelton was undeterred.
He admitted he continued with this pattern of behavior for a month and a half after first law
enforcement contact, (PSI, p.6), but the conduct underlying the third case on appeal occurred ten
months after the conduct underlying the first case, showing that Shelton’s criminal behavior
continued well after contact by law enforcement, his arrest, and even his entry of plea in the earlier
two cases. (Compare PSI, p.4 (conduct underlying first and second case occurred on October 4,
2017), and 6/13/18 Tr. (entry of plea on first two cases), with R. Vol. III, p.8 (conduct underlying
third case occurred on August 17, 2018.)
The district court considered Shelton’s criminal history and underlying conduct. It noted
that Shelton had “[n]ine or ten” prior felonies and has “been in and out of prison.” (9/19/18 Tr.,
p.26, L.22 – p.27, L.3.) The PSI recommended a period of incarceration “[b]ased on [Shelton]’s
documented criminal record, and the continued theft after law enforcement initially interviewed
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him.” (PSI, p.19.) The district court did not abuse its discretion when it followed the PSI’s
recommendation and imposed an aggregate unified sentence in all three cases of eight years with
three years fixed.
Shelton argues his sentences are excessive “[i]n light of the mitigating factors present,”
such as his substance abuse issues, support in the community, and remorse for his actions.
(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-8.) However, those mitigating factors were all presented to the district
court in the PSI and at sentencing. (See PSI, pp.15-16; 9/19/18 Tr., p.21, Ls.9-18 (substance abuse
issues); PSI, pp.71-75 (letters of support); PSI, p.17; 9/19/18 Tr., p.24, L.16 – p.26, L.21 (Shelton’s
remorse).) The district court reasonably concluded that the mitigating factors did not warrant
lesser sentences in light of the aggravating factors like Shelton’s criminal history and ongoing
criminal behavior throughout the pendency of his cases. Shelton has shown no abuse of the district
court’s sentencing discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to dismiss Shelton’s appeal; alternatively, the
state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 17th day of August, 2021.

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 17th day of August, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

KLJ/dd

/s/ Kacey L. Jones
KACEY L. JONES
Deputy Attorney General
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